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CRITERIA CASES DIFFICULTY MOTIVATION RANK
Probability
Unlikely Strong Low 1
Possible Solvable Reasonable 2
Likely None High 3
CRITERIA CASES USER SYSTEM RANK
Impact
Low Annoyance Very Limited Outages 1
Medium Loss of Service Limited Outages 2
High Loss of Service Long time Outages 3
Risk
Minor No Need for Countermeasure 1, 2
Major Threat Needs to be Handled 3, 4

































































Table  2  Features  and benefits  of   the  802.16 of  Physical  Layer   (PHY)  features.   (Worldwide   Interoperability   for 
Microware Access Forum, n.d)
FEATURES BENEFITS
256 point ODFM Built in support for addressing multipath in outdoor LOS & NLOS environment
Adaptive  Modulation  and  variable  error 
connection encoding per RF burst
Ensure a robust RF link maximizing the number of lists for  
each subscriber unit
TDD & FDD duplexing support Address varying worldwide regulation where one or  both  may be allowed
Flexible Channel Sizes
(eg 3.5, 5, 10 MHz)
Provides  the  flexibility  necessary  to  operate  in  many 
frequency bands with ranging channel requirement around 
the world
Designed to support smart antenna system
Smart antenna system are becoming more affordable and as  
those costs come down their ability to suppress interference 
and increase system gain will  become important to Band 
Wireless Access (BWA)
Reed­Solomon GF(256) is the type of Forward Error Correction (FEC) used which has a variable block size and 
error   fixing   capabilities   stated   by   the   IEEE  Communication  Magazine   (2002).   Coupled  with   an   inner   block 
convolution code, the FEC steadily broadcast crucial information such as frame control and initial access.
The FEC solutions  are   integrated with Quadrature Phase  Shift  Keying (QPSK),  16­state  Quadrature Amplitude 















preamble,   being   the   frame   synchronization   purpose.  The   downlink  map   reveals   the   commencement  point   and 
transmission features of data burst whereas the uplink map reveals the allotment of the bandwidth to the MS for the 





































MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) LAYER DETAILS
The Medium Access Control  (MAC) normally embeds a service-specific  convergence sublayer that  interacts to 
higher levels above the core MAC common part sublayer that includes the key MAC function. The privacy sublayer 






provide  Quality  of  Service  (QoS),  and  to establish bandwidth  allocation.  As well  as   these  basic  functions,   the 
convergence sublayer also has the ability to achieve highly intricate tasks such as the reconstruction and suppression 
payload header to boost airlink performance.





and  traffic   limits,   routing and sending information  to  the correct  convergence sublayer.  The connection used  is 
usually fixed with a 16­bit connection identifier (CID).
Table   3   demonstrates   the   features   and   benefits   of   the   802.16   of  MAC Layer.   (Worldwide   Interoperability   for 
Microware Access Forum, n.d)
FEATURES BENEFITS
TDM / TDMA Scheduled Downlink/Uplink frames Efficient bandwidth usage
Scalable from 1 to 100 of subscribers Allows  cost  effective  deployments  by  supporting  enough subs to deliver robust business case.
Connection-oriented 1) Per Connection QoS2) Faster packet routing and forwarding
QoS supportContinuous GrantReal Time Variable Bit  
RateNon Real Time Variable Bit RateBest Effort
1) Low latency for delay sensitive services (TDM     
      Voice, VoIP)
2) Optimal transport for VBR traffic(e.g., video)·
Automatic Retransmission request (ARQ) Improves end-to-end performance by hiding RFlayer induced errors from upper layer protocols
Support for adaptive modulation Enables highest data rates allowed by channelconditions, improving system capacity
Security and encryption (Triple DES) Protects user privacy
Automatic Power control Enables cellular deployments by minimizing selfinterference














































Manual configuration is  not required to find the operating channel as   the MAC protocol  includes an automatic 




After   selecting   the   channel(s)   to   endeavor   data   exchange,   the   SS   attempts   to   synchronize   to   the   downlink 
transmission by locating the intermittent frame preambles. Once the physical layer is synchronized, the SS searches 
for   the frequently  broadcast  DCD or UCD message  that   facilitates  the SS  to   learn  the modulation of   the FEC 
schemes used on the carrier.
SS AUTHENTICATION & REGISTRATION
Each SS  includes an  X.509 digital  certificate which   is  manufacturer­issued and factory­installed as  well  as   the 
manufacturer’s certificate. The connection of the 48­bit MAC address of the SS and its RSA key is permitted due to 
the SS sending Authorization Request and Authorization Information messages to the BS seeking verification of the 
certificates.  At   this   stage   the   network   also   identifies   the  SSs   authorization   permissions.  To   complete  network 
approval of the SS, the BS replies to the request with an Authorization Reply carrying an Authorization Key (AK) 
encrypted with the SSs public key. 













THREAT ALGORITHM USED PROBABILITY IMPACT RISK
Jamming 3 1 3
Scrambling 2 1 2
Eavesdropping  Management 
Message 3:3 2:1 6:3
Eavesdropping Traffic DES – CBCAES – CCM
BS or MS Masquerading
Device List 3 3 9
X.509 certificate-based 2:1 3:2 6:2
EAP 2:2 3:2 6:4
Management  Message 
Modification
NO MAC 3 3 9
SHA –1  MAC 2 3 6
AES MAC 1 3 3
THREAT ALGORITHM USED PROBABILITY IMPACT RISK
Data Traffic Modification Without AES 3 1 3With AES 1 1 1



















































based   network   environment.   After   evaluating   the   analysis   carried   out   on   the   threats   to   the   security   of   the 
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